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PEOPLE fl. RISER

[Crim. No. 5896. In Bank. Dee. 31, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent v.RICHARD G. RISER,
Appellant.
(1] Homicide-P1Ulishment.-Pen. Code, § 190, relating to punishment for murder in the first degree, does not impose the death
penalty, leaving discretion with the jury to substitute a lesser
penalty; it imposes neither death nor life imprisonment, but
with a perfectly even hand presents the two alternatives to
the jury.
[2] Id.-Punishment.-Pen. Code, § 190, relating to punishment
for first degree murder, calls for the exercise by the jurors
of a legal discretion in choosing between imposition of either
the death penalty or life imprisonment, not for the unswerving
application of views formulated before trial that will compel
a certain result no matter what the trial may reveal.
[3] J'ury-Challenges.-Pen. Code, § 1074, subd. 8, authorizing challenge of a prospective juror for implied bias if the offense
eharged be punishable with death and he entertains such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding defendant
.guilty, does not literally compel the exclnsion of jurors incapable of exercising the discretion contemplated by Pen.
Code, § 190, relating to punishment for first degree murder,
but it would be doing violence to the purpose of these sections
to construe § 1074, subd. 8, to permit such jurors to serve,
since this would work a de facto abolition of capital punishment.
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons
and Instruments of Orime.-Expert testimony that .38 special
shells containing bullets that were copper-coated factory loads
resembled in weight and shape a factory-load bullet found
at the scene of the murder charged and were of the same
type and from the same manufacturer, together with the prosecution's showing that the .38 shells found in a codefendant's
brief case would fit the type of revolver known to have been
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 321 et seq.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 2-4; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 718.
McR:. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide, § 242; [3] Jury, § 103
(7); [4-8] Criminal Law, § 536(1); [9] Criminal Law, § 1382(23);
[10] Criminal Law, § 393(2); [11] Criminal Law, § 393(3); (12)
Criminal Law, § 1432; [13] Criminal Law, § 1266; [14-16) Criminal
Law, §534; [17,31] Criminal Law, §544; [18] Homicide, §183;
[19] Homicide, § 267; [20-22] Homicide, § 236; [23) Criminal
Law, § 565; 24-26, 28, 29] Criminal Law, § 271; [27] Witnesses,
§§ 202,244; [30] Criminal Law, § 136L

Dec. 1956]

PEOPLE ". RISER

&67

('7 C.2d 566; 305 P.2d 11

used in the killings, justified the court's admitting the factory
loads.
[5] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and Instruments of Crime.-Expert testimony that hand-cast bullets in .38
special shells found at the scene of the crime bore "a remarkable resemblance" to those found in a codefendant's brief case,
and were probably poured from the same batch of lead, justified
their admission in evidence.
[6] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and Instruments of Crime.-Where the murder charged was done
with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver, which was
never recovered, and there was expert testimony that a holster
found in a codefendant's brief case indicated that it had once
carried such a revolver, possession of the holster was relevant
to the issue of possession of the murder weapon.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and Instruments of Crime.-When a specific type of weapon used
to commit a homicide is not known, it may be permissible to
admit into evidence weapons found in defendant's possession
Bome time after the crime that could have been the weapons
employed, and there Deed be DO conclusive demonstration
that the weapon in defendant's possession was the murder
weapon.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and Instruments of Orime.-When the prosecution relies on a specific
type of weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other
weapons were found in defendant's possession, since such evidence tends to show, Dot that he committed the crime, but
only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly weapons.
[9] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence.-Where the murder charged was. done with a Smith and
Wesson .88 Special revolver, which was never recovered, and
.38 special shells and a holster found in a codefendant's brief
case were properly admitted in evidence, and from such evidence the jury would have concluded that defendant possessed firearms, he was not prejudiced by error in admission
of a loaded Colt .38 revolver, a box of .22 shells, two other
holsters and two ammunition belts found in his possession,
since the .38 shells would fit either a Colt or a Smith and
Wesson .38 Special, and without the Colt in evidence the jury
might more easily have concluded that the ammunition was
kept for a Smith and Wesson.
[10] Id.-Evidence-Other Orimes.-Evidence of other crimes is
not admissible when its sole effect is to show a criminal disposition, but if it tends logically and by reasonable inference
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137; Am.Jur., Evidence, § all
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to establish any taet material for the prosecution or to overcome any material fact sought to be proved by the defense, it is
admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense
not ~cluded in the charge.
[11] Id.-Evidenee-Other Crimes.-Where the murder charged
was done with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver, which
was never recovered, and there was evidence that at the time
of commission of a prior offense defendants had been in
the possession of three guns and that only two of these were
known not to have been Smith and Wesson .38 Specials, a
P38 automatic was admissible to corroborate testimony that
defendants acquired such weapon at a time when they already
had two guns, such evidence that defendants had a third gun
of unknown make being relevant to show that they had the
means to commit the crime.
[12] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-lDstructionsEvidenee.-In a prosecution for murder, defendant could not
successfully complain that the court should have immediately
instructed the jury that a codefendant's references to his
participation in previous robberies eould not be used against
him since the prosecution did not show that he had been
present when codefendant was interrogated, where throughout
the trial the court, when requested to do so, instructed clearly
that statements made by one defendant were not evidence
against another defendant who had not been present, and
repeated this warning in its general instructions at the close
of the trial, and where defendant did not request the court
to repeat its warning at this particular juncture.
[1S] ld.-Appeal-Who May Urge Errors-Errors Meeting Codefendant.-Defendant may not complain that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that a
codefendant had in fact made the statements attributed to him
where the injury, if any, was to such codefendant whose
appeal is not before the appellate court.
[14] ld.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preljmjnary Proof.
-The party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative
evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at
the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis
there has been no substitution or tampering.
.
[15] ld.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof.
-The burden on the party offering demonstrative evidence is
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all
the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty
with which the particular evidence could have been altered,
it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration, and the
requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital
link in the chain of possession is not accounted for.

')
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[16] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof.
-When it is the barest speculation that there was tampering
with demonstrative evidence, it is proper to admit the evidence
and let what doubt remains go to its weight.
[17] Id. - Evidence - Demonstrative Evidence - Fingerprints.Where defendant did not point to any indication of actual
tampering with fingerprints on a bottle and glass testified to
as being his, did not show how they could have been forged,
and did not establish that anyone who might have been
interested in tampering Jmew that the bottle and glass were
in a deputy sheriff's unlocked book case for a few hours, it
was not error to admit the bottle and glass in evidence.
[18] Homicide - Instructions - Degree of Offense. - It was not
error to instruct the jury that, although there are two degrees
of murder, the evidence is such that either or both defendants
are innocent of the charge of murder or that one or both of
them are guilty of first degree murder, where the evidence
was overwhelming that the homicide was committed in the
perpetration of a robbery.
[19] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-InstructioDS.-Where the evidence was such that defendant was guilty, if at all, of murder
in the perpetration of a robbery and the jury was instructed
that such offense was first degree murder, other instructions
on the code definition of murder, including provisions on premeditated murder and second degree murder, and the code
definition of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 189, 211), were unnecessary, but if any confusion was generated by such instructions
it could only have benefited defendant by leading the jury
to think that the question of degree of murder was still open
to its determination.
[10] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury may not weigh the
possibility of pardon or parole in determining the guilt of
accused in a murder case, but it may consider these consequences in exercising its discretion to choose between different
punishments.
[21] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-It was not error for the
court in a murder case to give the jury information about
eligibility for parole before it had determined the question of
guilt or innocence, where the court cautioned the jury against
allowing such information to influence its determination of
guilt.
[22] Id.-InBtructions-Punishment.-It was not error in a prosecution for murder committed with a firearm to instruct the
jury that defendant could be paroled in sevell years if sentenced
to life imprisonment, since the provision of Pen. Code, § 8024,
aubd. (b), fixing the minimum sentences for persons armed with
deadly weapons at 10 years, is not concerned with how much of

)

570

PEoPLE tI.

RISER

[47 C.2d

a Bentence must be served before a prisoner is eligible for
parole, and Pen. Code, 13048, limiting eligibility for parole
when defendant has been adjudicated a habitual criminal, was
not applicable where no prior convictions were charged in the
indictment.
[28] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Identit,-.-Evidence that after an
eyewitness to a murder identified defendant in a police lineup
as the man she had Been at the Bcene of the crime a police
officer had been to her house on numerous occasions, showing
her pictures of defendant, and that after her appearance
before the grand jury the district attorney had discussed her
testimony with her, was insufficient to justify a conclusion
that her identification was the result of an idea planted in
her mind by the prosecution.
[24] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-When production
I is sought by subpoena during trial of documents referred to
on cross-examination, the question is not whether defendant
will be allowed advance disclosure of evidence on which the
prosecution plans to base its ease, but whether he will be
allowed any disclosure of evidence that the prosecution does
not intend to produce in court, and the possibility that defendant will obtain perjured testimony or fabricated evidence as a
result of disclosure at this point in the proceedings is too
slight to justify denying production.
[25] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-On a proper showing a defendant in a criminal ease can compel production of a
document when it becomes clear during the course of trial
that the prosecution has in its possession relevant and
material evidence.
[26] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confldential
for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the State has
no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that
can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has
no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who
have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly
impeached as the evidence permits, and to deny flatly any
right of production of documents in the prosecution's possession on the ground that an imbalance would be created between the advantages of prosecution and defense would be to
lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts.
[27] Witnesses-Impeachment-Bias: Inconsistent Statements.Intended impeachment of prosecution witnesses justifying the
compelling of production by the prosecution of a document is
not necessarily restricted to impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements to the exclusion, for example, of impeachment for
bias.
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[28a,28b] Criminal Law-Compelling Production of Evidence.The court in a murder case erred in vacating a subpoena duces
tecum for production of documents in the prosecution's possession on the ground that the statements therein could not be
used to impeach contrary testimony of witnesses, where it did
not see the statements, and where, even if they were not signed,
defendant might have been able to show, by the testimony
of a stenographer or other witnesses or by admission of the
witnesses themselves, that the statements had been accurately
transcribed and therefore could be used for impeachment and
where the prosecution could not claim that the necessities
of law enforcement required that the statements be kept confidential in view of the fact that the police had released
the substance of the statements to the press.
[29] Id.-Compel1ing Production of Evidence.-The proper test
for determining whether production of a document must be
granted is not whether the evidence has been conclusively
proved admissible, but whether there is good reason to believe
that the document when produced would be admissible in
evidence for some purpose.
[80a,80b] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Denying Production of
Evidence.-Error in denying production of a document in the
prosecution's possession with reference to prior inconsistent
statements of eyewitnesses to the murder charged did not
result in a miscarriage of justice where there was no reasonable
probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict
had defendant been allowed to introduce such statements in
evidence, there being, in addition to fingerprints, evidence th3t
defendant possessed hand-cast bullets that probably had a
common origin with bullets found at the scene of the crime,
evidence that he had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38
Special, the type of gun used in committing the crime, and
ev:dence that he had had an unidentified gun in addition to
those he admitted owning.
[81] ld. - Evidence - Demonstrative Evidence - Fingerprints. Fingerprint evidence is the strongest evidence of identity,
and is ordinarily sufficient alone to identify defendant.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. b) from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus
County and from an order denying a new trial. Frank C.
Damrell, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. ludgment of conviction imposing
death penalty, affirmed.
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William H. Coburn, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Richard G. Riser and his brother Roscoe
R. Riser were charged by indictment with the murder of
Earl and Pauline Hastings. The jury returned verdicts of
guilty of murder in the first degree, without fixing the punishment at life imprisonment in the case of Richard G. Riser.
The court denied his motion for a new trial and sentenced
him to death. His appeal to this court is automatic under
section 1239, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code~
Just before midnight on July 11, 1955, Earl and Pauline
Hastings, proprietors of the Hilltop Cafe near Oakdale in
Stanislaus County, were shot and killed during the course of a
robbery of their cafe. Mr. Basford, a customer, left the cafe
about 11 :30 p. m. On his way out he passed two men who
remarked that they were going in to have a beer. He was unable to identify either of the. men, but thought that they
had driven up to the Hilltop in a two-tone Chrysler, Buick or
Pontiac.
When these men entered the cafe, the only persons present
were two customers, Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel, both seated
at the bar, and the Hastings. The men sat on stools at the end
of the bar away from the other customers and ordered beers.
After they had ordered a second round of beers, the shorter
of the two rose from his stool, drew a gun, and announced,
"This is a stick-up." The other man, who was also armed,
silently took a position by the front door, while his companion
went behind the bar where the Hastings were. . In an attempt to prevent the robbery, Mr. Hastings seized a bottle and
attacked the gunman. In the ensuing struggle Hastings was
struck several times on the forehead and shot. The same
gunman then shot and killed Mrs. Hastings, apparently as she
was trying to reach a gun. Then he stepped over Mr.
Hastings' body, rifled the cash register, and departed with the
gunman at the door.
The police arrived shortly after midnight, removed the
bodies, and searched and photographed the premises. They
recovered several bullets fired by the gunman, and dusted
for fingerprints bottles and glasses found on the bar in front
iof the stools used by the two men.
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Mrs. Burgess identified Richard and Roscoe Riser as the
two gunmen and testiDed that Richard had done the shooting.
She admitted that she had been in the bar since 7 :30 p. m.
and had had five beers, that the bar was quite dark, and
that she could not see one of the men too well. Mr. Pantel
testified that he thought Richard was the man who did the
shooting, but was not positive; that he had not seen Roscoe
before the police lineup at Stockton, and that the man at the
door appeared to be of Filipino or Mexican extraction. Expert witnesses testified that fingerprints found on a bottle
and a glass removed from the bar were the fingerprints of
Richard Riser, and that bullets found in a brief case in
Roscoe '8 Chrysler were similar in composition to bullets
found at the scene of the crime. The killing had been done
with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver. This gun was
never recovered, but according to expert testimony a holster
found in Roscoe's car had once carried a Smith and Wesson
.38 Special revolver. The brothers' defense was an alibi:
that they had been in Stockton on the night of July 11th.
During the voir dire examination of jurors, Hardy M.
Dunavin stated that he did not believe in capital punishment,
that nothing would prevent his finding defendant guilty if
the evidence warranted it, but that in no event would he vote
for the death penalty. In response to the court's question
whether he entertained conscientious scruples that would prevent his finding defendant guilty if the offense charged could
be punishable with death, he replied, "No." On the basis of
these answers, and over defendant's objection, the court
sustained a challenge by the prosecution under section 1074,
subdivision 8, of the Penal Code.
Section 1074, subdivision 8, provides that: "A challenge
for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following
causes, and for no other . . . 8. If the offense charged be
punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty;
in which case he must neither be permitted nor compelled
to serve as a juror." Defendant contends that, although
this provision requires the exclusion of jurors whose determination of guilt would be affected by their views of capital
punishment, neither its language nor its policy require the
exclusion of those whose assessment of punishment alone would
be influenced, and that section 190 in providing that a person
found guilty of murder in the first degree "shall suffer death,
-or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion
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of the jury ••• " has made the determination of guilt and
the assessment of punishment separate questions. The prosecution contends that the statute and decisions of this court
require exclusion even when scruples go only to the assessment of punishment.
In support of its position the prosecution cites People v .
.Ah Ohung, 54 Cal. 398, 402, and People v. Amaya, 134 Cal.
531, 535 [66 P. 794], where this court upheld challenges
under section 1074, subdivision 8. In neither of those cases,
however, would the effect of the juror's opinion have been
confined to the assessment of punishment. Because the jurors
stated that they would not find the defendants guilty on
the basis of circumstantial evidence alone when the penalty
might be death, it was clear that although they were not unqualifiedly opposed to capital punishment, their views of its
seriousness would affect their weighing the evidence in the
determination of guilt. (See also People v. Warner, 147
Cal. 546, 550 [82 P. 196].)
Likewise distinguishable is People v. Oe'buUa, 137 Cal. 314,
317 [70 P. 181], because the juror there stated that his conscience would not permit him to bring in a verdict of guilty.
Since the practical effect of permitting such a juror to ·serve
would be to assure acquittal, the distinction between his state
of mind and that of juror Dunavin in the present case is not
merely verbal. For the same reason People v. Sanchez, 24
Cal. 17, 22, People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 346 [19 P. 161],
and People v. Mille,., 177 Cal. 404, 407 [170 P. 817], are not
direct authority in the present situation. In each of these
cases the juror stated that his conscientious opinion would
affect his determination of guilt. The Sanchez case came at
a time when the jury had no discretion to fix the punishment,
so that the only way a juror could effectively express his
opposition to capital punishment was by finding the defendant not guilty. Similarly in the Goldenson and Miller cases,
although the jury had by then been given discretion to choose
between death and life imprisonment, it was not yet clear
that one juror acting alone could prevent imposition of the
extreme penalty. Before People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 453458 [249 P. 859], it was widely thought that the death penalty
remained the norm, and that a unanimous jury was needed to
reduce the penalty to life imprisonment, so that the juror's
only course was to find the defendant not guilty.
People v. Rollins, 179 Cal. 793, 795-796 [179 P. 209], also
came before People v. Hall, and may be distinguished on the
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same ground as these other (':lSI'S. But the court articulated
a broad reason for excluding fTt\\Il the jury those who are opposed to the death penalty, ewn though tbeir scruples would
not .prevent their finding the tll.fendant guilty: cc [T]he diser~tIon given to the jux:y [br § ]90] to provide for life imprISonment in such a case is Ilut an arbitrary discretion to
be exercised without regard to Ole circullll~tances of the par~icu1ar ease, but only where it appears to the jury that there
18 some eircUDlStance that WIlTJ'lInts or justifies the imposition
of the lesser punishment." (179 Cal. at 796.) General views
of the social desirability or moral permissibility of capital
punis~ent could logically hn\'c no place among .the factors
m:8uencmg the exercise of a cliscretion so conceIved. (See
also People v. Collins, 105 Cnl. 504, 512 [39 P. 16] ; People
v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 148 1a P. 597, 52 Am.Rep. 295] ; ct·
People v. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257, 258-260.) Our decisions since
the Rollins ease have without discussion systematically excluded jurors opposed to tIlll death pcnalty, apparently accepting the reasoning of the ]tOlliIlS ease in regard to the relation between sectioIlS 190 aml 1074, subdivision 8. (People
v. Riley, 35 Ca1.2d 279, 284 1217 P.2d 625] ; People v. Hoyt,
20 Cal.2d 306, 318 [125 P.2d 29] ; People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d
731, 744-745 [104 P.2d 794], cert. denied, 312 U.S. 703 [61
S.Ct. 806, 85 L.Ed. 1136].)
We have recently critich'!ll(l this interpretation of section
190 in People v. Green 47 CIl1.2d 209 [302 P.2d 307], holding it error to instruct ~ jury that it must find mitigating cir':
eumstances in a case to jURtify fixing the punishment at life
imprisonment. [1] Section 190 does not impose the death
penalty, leaving discretion with the jury to substitute a lesser
penalty; it imposes neither death nor )ife imprisonment, but
with a perfectly even hand presents the two alternatives to
the jury. The Legislature pl!rhaps because of the very gravity
of the choice, has formul~t(!d no rules to control the exercise
of the jury's discretion.
[2] We did not suggeflt in the Green case, however, that
section 190 did not require of the jurors a meaningful choice
between these alternative!!, a choice fundamentaUy based on
the evidence and made during and not before deliberation on
the verdict. The statute ealls for the exercise of a legal discretion, not for the unswerving application of views formulated
before trial that will coml'd a certain result no matter what
the trial may reveal.
[3] Admittedly, a litl'~Tal reading of section 1074, sub-

.-
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division 8, does not compel the exclusion of jurors incapable
of exercising the discretion contemplated by section 190.It would be doing violence to the purpose of these sections of
the Penal Code, however, to construe section 1074, subdivision
8, to permit these jurors to serve. It would in all probability
work a de facto abolition of capital punishment, a result
which, whether or not desirable of itself, it is hardly appropriate for this court to achieve by construction of an ambiguous statute.
Defendant contends that the admission in evidence of certain guns, holsters, belts, and shells was erroneous on the
ground that they were not relevant to any issue in the ease.
On the morning of July 23rd, almost two weeks after the
homicides, police found in Roscoe's Chrysler a brief ease containing three holsters, two leather belts, each with twelve
rounds of .38 special shells, a box of .22 shells, and fifty-nine
.38 special shells. Two more .38 shells were found in the seat
of the automobile. On the same day police arrested Richard
and seized a loaded Colt .38 revolver in his possession. Later,
following directions given them by Roscoe, they discovered
a P38 automatic with a clip of shells in a cesspool. The court
overruled objections to testimony describing the finding of
these objects and also admitted them into evidence.
[4] Some of the .38 special shells contain bullets that
were copper-coated factory loads, and others contained handeast lead bullets. There was expert testimony that the factory loads resembled in weight and shape a factory-load bullet
found at the scene of the crime, and although the expert could
not say that they came from the same box as that bullet, he did
maintain that they were of the same type and from the same
manufacturer. Defendant brought out that this type of bullet
is in common use throughout the country; nevertheless, the
similarity testified to by the expert, together with the prosecution's showing that the .38 shells found in the brief case would
fit the type of revolver known to have been used in the killings, justified the trial court's admitting the factory loads.
[5] The relevancy of the hand-cast bullets was even clearer.
There was expert testimony, based on spectroscopic analysis
*The awkwardness of testing the juror by use of the exact language
of eeetion 1074, subdivision 8, was made abundantly clear in the present
ease. Time and again the court questioned the juror in the statutory
language, and time and again the juror replied that he did not entertain
BUch an opinion "as would prevent him futding the defendant guilty."
Finally, in order to make it clear to the juror that he was being asked
if he opposed the death penalty, the court was compelled to abandon
• iIae Ita~ laDpa&..
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of the metal in the bullets, that those found in the brief case
were probably poured from the same batch of lead as the
hand-cast bullets found at the scene of the crime. The expert
found "a remarkable resemblance."
[6] As to the holsters, experts testified that markings in
People's Exhibit No. 26 indicated that it had once carried
a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver. Even if this is a
popular gun, we cannot say that possession of the holster was
not relevant to the issue of the Risers' possessioJl of the murder
weapon.
The prosecution's own witness established that the bullets
found at the scene of the crime had been fired from a Smith
and Wesson .38 Special revolver, not from either the Colt .38
or the P38 that the court admitted into evidence. [7] When
the specific type of weapon used to commit a homicide is not
known, it may be permissible to admit into evidence weapons
found in the defendant's possession some time after the crime
that could have been the weapons employed. There need be
no conelusive demonstration that the weapon in defendant's
possession was the murder weapon. (People v. Ferdinand,
194 Cal. 555, 563 [229 P. 341] ; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105,
113-114 [193 P. 92].) [8] When the prosecution relies,
however, on a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit
evidence that other weapons were found in his possession, for
such evidence tends to show, not that he committed the crime,
but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly
weapons. (People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113, 121 [112 P. 862] ;
People v. O'Brien, 130 Cal. 1, 5 [62 P. 297] ; People v. Yee
Flook Din, 106 Cal. 163, 165-167 [39 P. 530] ; People v. Wong
Ak Leong, 99 Cal. 440 [34 P. 105].) People v. Beltowski,
'l1 Cal.App.2d 18, 23 [162 P.2d 59], cited by the prosecution
as contrary to this proposition, is adequately distinguished in
People v. Richardson, 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 541-542 [169 P.2d
44], on the ground that no speeificweapon was relied on in
the Beltowski case. It was error therefore to admit the Colt,
two of the holsters, the belts, and the box of .22 shells. The
P3S was admissible on other grounds that appear below.
[9] Defendant, however, was not prejudiced by these
errors. The shells and one holster were clearly admissible,
and from these the jury would have concluded that defendant
possessed firearms. The admission of the Colt, more holsters,
belts, and shells added little to the jury's knowledge gained
from evidence correctly admitted. The introduction Of the
C'f C.td-lII
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Colt may have actually benefited defendant, for it provided
an explanation for his possession of the .38 shells. An expert
testified that these shells would fit either a Colt or a Smith
and Wesson .38 Special, and without the Colt in evidence the
jury might more easily have concluded that the ammunition
was kept for a Smith and Wesson.
Defendant next cites as prejudicial error the introduction
of evidence of other crimes. On the stand defendant maintained that the only pistols he had ever owned were the Colt,
the PS8, and a toy cap pistol, and he denied having a Smith
and Wesson .88 Special. He stated that he had obtained the
PS8 from a sailor in the New Viking Bar, and denied having
told a police officer that he had taken it from Doc's Village,
a different bar. Officer Dutil then testified that defendant
had told him that he had taken the PS8 from Doc's Village on
June 29, 1955. The prosecution followed this with testimony
by the bartender at Doc's Village that the two brothers had
robbed Doc's Village on June 29th, that each had been armed
with a blue steel gun, and that they had taken away with
them a PS8 kept behind the bar. Finally, the owner of Doc's
Village identified the PS8 found in the cesspool as the one
that had been kept behind the bar.
[10] Evidence of other crimes is not admissible when it
sole effect is to show a criminal disposition, but if it "tends
logically and by reasonable inference to establish any fact
material for the prosecution, or overcome any material fact
sought to be proved by the defense, [it] is admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge." (People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504,
609 [218 P.2<1 981] ; see People v. Citrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 288 .•
[294 P.2d 82].)
.
The cross-examination of defendant to discover whether
he had ever owned a Smith and Wesson .38 Special and when
he had acquired the PS8, and the testimony of the witnesses
from Doc's Village, tended to establish that the Risers entered
Doc's Village on June 29th armed with two blue steel guns;
that they there acquired the PS8; that therefore they had at
one time been in possession of three guns, and that only two
of these were known not to have been Smith and Wesson .88
Specials. [11] The PS8 was admissible to corroborate the
bartender's testimony that the Risers acquired the PS8 at
a time when they already had two guns. This evidence that
the Risers had a third gun of unknown make was relevant to
show that they had the means to commit the crime. (See
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PeopZe v. Simeone, 26 Ca1.2d 795, 804-805 {161 P.2d 369].)
The trial court closely limited the effect of the testimony on the Doc's Village incident to showing how the
Risers were armed and when they obtained the P3S, and
specifically instructed the jury against drawing broad inferences of criminal tendencies. The court's further limitation of the testimony to purposes of impeachment was, if anything, unduly favorable to defendant.
Roscoe Riser also took the stand. On direct examination
he stated that he had never been involved in a robbery; on
cross-examination the district attorney gave detailed descriptions of numerous robberies committed in San Francisco by
R{)scoe and Richard, intermittently asking Roscoe if he had
not furnished these descriptions in admitting the robberies
to the police. Roscoe denied the prior inconsistent statements.
[12] Defendant complains that the court should hav!'
immediately instructed the jury that these references to his
participation in robberies could in no way be used against
him, since the prosecution did not show that he had been
present when Roscoe was interrogated. Throughout the trial
the court, whenever requested to do so, instructed clearly
and at length that statements made by one defendant were
not evidence against another defendant who had not been
present, and it repeated this warning in its general instructions
at the close of the trial. There is no reason to suppose that
the jury, even though not reinstructed at this particular
juncture, did not understand and apply the general principle
the court had laid down. Furthermore, since defendant did
not request the court to repeat its warning at this time, he
cannot now complain.·
[13] Defendant says that it was misconduct for the
prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that Roscoe had in
fact made the statements attributed to him; that since the
prosecutor apparently had neither the intention nor the
means of establishing the truth of his allegations, he must
have made them solely to inflame the jury against the brothers.
(Cf. People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242, 24S-249 [246 P.2d 636],)
We must assume, however, that in view of the court's instructions the jury did not consider defendant's alleged participation in the robberies. The injury, if any, was to Roscoe,
and his appeal is not now before us.
As a further error, defendant complains of the admission
in evidence of a bottle and a glass bearing fingerprints testiAed to be the fingerprints of Richard Riser. Deputy Sheriff
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Lochry identified the bottle and glass as articles that he haa:
taken from the Hilltop Caf6. When he arrived at the Caf6, C
early in the morning of July 12th, he found several bottles,··
glasses, and salt cellars on the bar. He dusted them for
fingerprints, put them in a box, and locked the box in the
sherifl"s identification truck. About 4 or 5 a. m. he returned
to the .sherifi' 's office and put the articles in an open book
case in an office that he shared with another police officer.
This office was unlocked; it was :flanked on one side by an
office shared by two or three persons, and on the other side
by a hall leading to a general office. According to Lochry,·
the evidence remained in the book ease approximately four
hours, until about 8 :30 a. m., when it was removed and thereafter kept under lock and key or in the custody of specific
persons.
Defendant contends that in view of these facts the prosecution failed to establish continuous possession, which is a
necessary foundation for the admission of demonstrative evi.dence; that since someone could have altered the prints or
imposed wholly new ones during the four hours the glass and
bottle were left unguarded in the book case, the prosecution
has not sufficiently identified the prints as those that existed
when the articles were removed from the bar. Defendant
would require the prosecution to negative all possibility of
tampering.
[14] Undoubtedly the party relying on an expert analysis
of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the
evid~ce found at the scene ·of the crime, and that between
receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tampering (see People v. Coleman, 100 Cal.App.2d 797, 801 [224
P.2d 837]; 21 AL.R.2d 1216, 1219, 1236-1237), but it has
never been suggested by the cases, what the practicalities of
proof could not tolerate, that this burden is an absolute one
requiring the party to negative all possibility of tampering.
(See, e.g., People v. Brown, 92 Cal.App.2d 360, 365 [206 P.2d
1095] ; Oommonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [124 A. i
Ifl3] .)
[15] The burden on the party offering the evidence is
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all :
the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been
altered, it is reasonably certain that thpre was no alteration.
The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when
some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted
1
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for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence
analyzed was not the evidence originally received. Left to
such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. (See
Dobson v. Industrial Ace. Com., 114 Cal.App.2d 782, 785
[251 P.2d 349] ; McGowan v. Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d
386, 389-392 [223 P.2d 862, 21 A.L.R.2d 1206]; People v.
Smith, 55 Cal.App. 324, 327-329 [203 P. 816] ; Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588 [82 App.D.C. 95].) [16] Conversely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt
remains go to its weight. (See People v. Tomasovich, 56 Cal.
App. 520, 529 [206 P. 119] ; State v. Smith (Mo.), 222 S.W.
455, 458-459.) [17] In the present case defendant did not
point to any iIidication of actual tampering, did not show how
fingerprints could have been forged, and did not establish
that anyone who might have been interested in tampering
with the prints knew that the bottles and glasses were in
Deputy Sheriff Lochry's book case. There was no error in
the court's ruling.
[18] In the course of instructing the jury the court stated
that" Although there are two degrees of murder, the evidence
in this case is such that either both of the defendants, or one
of them, is innocent of the charge of murder ... or one or both
of the defendants are guilty of murder in the first degree.
. • • For murder which is committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate • . . robbery • • • is murder of the
first degree; whether the killing was intentional, unintentional
or accidental." (See Pen. Code, § 189.)
Defendant contends that it was error for the court thus
to remove from the jury's consideration the degree of murder,
and whether in fact it had been in the course of a robbery
or attempted robbery. The evidence, however, was overwhelming that the homicides had been committed in the
perpetration of a robbery, and when there is no reasonable
doubt on this issue the court is justified in withdrawing it
from the jury. (People v. Sanford, 33 Ca1.2d 590, 595 [203
P.2d 534]; People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 516 [66 P.2d
631] ; see People v. Rupp, 41 Ca1.2d 371, 381-382 [260 P.2d 1].)
Defendant offered no evidence indicating that a robbery had
not been committed, and in his own statement of facts to this
court he says that "ilie killing took place during the commission of a robbery."
[19] In addition to this instruction on felony murder,
the court gave the jury the code definition of murder, in-
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cluding the provisions OD premeditated murder and second
degree murder, and the code definition of robbery. (Pen.
Code, §§ 189, 211.) These instructions were unnecessary
because they covered questions that had already been withdrawn from the jury by the first instruction. But if any
COnfUSiOD was generated by these instructions, it could only
have benefited defendant by leading the jury to think that
the question of the degree of murder was still open to its
determination. (See People v. Peterson, 29 Cal.2d 69, 78-79
[173 P.2d 11], cert. denied, 331 U.S. 861 [67 S.Ct. 1751, 91
L.Ed. 1867].)
In the midst of its deliberations the jury returned to the
courtroom and the following discussion took place between
court and jury:
"THE FOREMAN: The question was, under those circumstances would either of the defendants be eligible for parole
if a recommendation was made for life imprisonment.
"THE CoURT: I see. Well, the answer of the Court is for
the purpose of determining the punishment and for that
purpose, only, it is the law that a person convicted of First
Degree Murder and sentenced to life imprisonment may be
eligible for parole. Does that answer your question'
"THE FOREMAN : Yea.
. "THE CO'OBT: I might state that it further provides that
they may be eligible for parole but not before he has served
.even calendar years. Now, I just state that the law is worded
that way."
The next day the jury informed the court that it had one
verdict complete as to one of the brothers. It then submitted
a written question to the court asking whether "In the event
of what is a verdict of guilty on both counts one and two, is
there any recommendation the Jury can make that would preclude the possibility of parole during the lifetime of a persOD
convicted." The court answered, "No." Within an hour the
jury returned its verdicts of guilty, fixing the punishment at
life imprisonment for Roscoe, but with no specification of
punishment for Richard. Under the instructions that were
given the verdict as to Richard necessarily implied that the
jury fixed the punishment at death.
[20] It is now well established that although the jury
may not weigh the possibility of pardon or parole in determining the guilt of an accused, it may consider these consequences in exercising its discretion to choose between different
punishment.. (Peopu v. Beese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117
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[801 P.2d 582]; People T. Byrd, 42 Ca1.2d 200, 206-208[266
P.2d 505], cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 [75 S.Ot. 78, 99 L.Ed.
668] ; People v. BarcZay, 40 Cal.2d 146, 158 [252 P.2d 321] ;
People v. Osborn, ,37 Ca1.2d 380, 884-385 [231 P.2d 850].)
[21] Defendant contends, however, that it was error for the
court to give the jury information about eligibility for parole
before it had determined the question of guilt or innocence.
This contention is without merit. In both People v. Beese,
supra, and People v. Byrd, supra, we upheld the trial court
when it had included in its original instructions to the jury
the information that one sentenced to life imprisonment could
be paroled. In those cases, as in the present one, ~ court
cautioned the jury against allowing this information to influence its determination of guilt. Prudence requires no more;
it does not require that the jury be kept in ignorance of the
consequences of different penalties until it has finally determined guilt. Moreover, it is by no means clear in the present
case that the jury, when it addressed its questions to the court,
had not already found defendant guilty.
[22] Defendant also claims that the court misinformed the
jury when it said that defendant could be paroled in seven
years if sentenced to life imprisonment; that because of sections 3024, subdivision (b), and 3048 of the Penal Code,
defendant could not be paroled in less than ten years.
Section 3024, subdivision (b), provides that the minimum
terms of sentence and imprisonment "for a person previously
convicted of a felony either in this State or elsewhere,· and
armed with a deadly weapon (is] ...10 years..•. " As
we pointed out in PeopZe v. Beue, 47 Cal.2d 112, 117-118
1301 P.2d 582], this provision is in an article of the code
concerned with the length of sentences and the fixing thereof,
and not with how much of a sentence must be served before
a prisoner is eligible for parole. That subject is covered in
a di1ferent article, embracing sections 3040 to' 3065. Section
3049 provides that a person whose minimum term of imprisonment is more than one year may be paroled at any time after
the expiration of one-third of the minimum term. Section
3046 limits section 3049 by stating that no person imprisoned
under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at
least seven calendar years. Authority to grant parole after
a certain portion of a minimum term has been served is not
destroyed by a provision such as section 3024 which sets the
minimum term itself.
>
Section 3048, also cited by defendant, limits eligibility for
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parole when a defendant has been adjudicated an habitual
erimina1. Such an adjudication cannot be made unless the
prior convictions on which it is to be based have been charged
in the indictment. (PeopZe v. Wagner, 78 Ca1.App. 503,
506-507 [248 P. 946].) No prior convictions were charged in
the indictment in the present case, therefore section 3048 has
no application.
[is] Defendant's most serious objections go to the eyewitness testimony of :Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel. One
charge is that the prosecution improperly coached Mrs.
Burgess into identifying defendant as the man she had seen
at the Hilltop. Mrs. Burgess identified defendant in a Stockton police lineup. She admitted that after this Lieutenant
Kilroy had been to her house on numerous occasions, shown
her pictures and taken her for rides, and that after her appearance before the grand jury the district attomey had cJiseussed
her testimony with her on several occasions. There is no evidence, however, that she was prepared in any way before the
lineup, and she specifically denied having seen pictures of
defendant before that time; This evidence is insofIicient
to justify a conclusion that Mrs. Burgess' identification was
the result of an idea planted in her mind by the prosecution.
Before trial defendant moved for an order direeting the
prosecution to furnish him with a copy of the fingerprint
taken from the bottle, and directing the sheri1f'. office of
Stanislaus County to allow him to inspect statemen1s made
to police by Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel immediately after
the homicides. The motion was denied.
After cross-examination of witnesses Burgess and Pantel, ~.\
defendant had issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to ..
Captain Ross of the sheriJf's office commanding him to produce the originals of the same statemen1s sought by the
pretrial motion. The aftidavit in support of the subpoena
asserted that the statements were material and relevant to
issues in the case and contradictory to the witnesses' present
testimony. Defendant first leamed of the statements from
local newspapers, which reported Captain Ross as saying that
the witnesses had described the man who did the shooting as
tall and slender, with a dark complexion and black hair, and
the other man as dark complexioned with black hair. Appar-:i
ently the Riser brothers have blond hair and light complexions, .~:
and dif£er significantly in other characteristics from the newspaper descriptions. On cross-examination Mrs. Burgess ad- .
mitted having made a statement to the police. She claimed,
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however, that she described the man who did the shooting
as stocky, not as tall and slender, and although she admitted
describing the man by the door as dark complexioned, she
denied having said that he had black hair.
The prosecution moved for an order vacating the subpoena.
Despite defendant's argument that he was entitled to the
statements for purposes of impeachment, the motion was
granted on the ground that the subpoena sought to bring into
court evidence that could not be used for impeachment and
was not otherwise admissible. Defendant contends that this
order was erroneous.
Originally at common law the accused in a criminal
action could not compel production of doeuments or other
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. (See 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 475-476; 8 ide at 219-220.)
Production was denied before trial on the ground that to
compel the prosecution to reveal its evidence beforehand would
enable the defendant to secure perjured testimony and fabricated evidence to meet the state's ease. It was felt, furthermore, that to allow the defendant to compel production when
the prosecution could not in its turn compel production from
the defendant because of the privilege against self incrimination would unduly shift to the defendant's side a balance of
advantages already heavily weighted in his favor. (See generally Btate v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203 [98A.2d 881] ; Btate ez ret
Bo'bBrl,on V. BteeZ, 117 Kinn. 384 [185 N.W. 1128, Ann.Cas.
1913D 343];6 Wigmore, Evidence, .upra, at 475-476.)
.[94] Whatever the force.of these arguments when directed
to pretrial discovery, they have little or no application when .
produetion is sought by subpoena during trial of statements
referred to on cross-examination. The question then is not
whether the defendant will be allowed advance disclosure of
evidence upon which the prosecution plans to base its ease, but
whether he will be allowed any disclosure of evidence that the
proseeution does not intend to produce in court at all. (See
United Statu v. KruZewitck, 145 F.2d 76, 78 [156 A.L.R.
337].) Furthermore, the additional possibility that the defendant will obtain perjured testimony or fabricated evidence
as a nsult of disclosure at this point in the proceedings is too
slight to justify denying production. [25] The decisions of
this ecmrt have always impliedly recognized that on a proper
showing a defendant in a criminal case can compel production
when it becomes clear during the course of trial that the
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App. 541, 543-544 [250 P. 406] ; Peopk v. NieJ,cu, 70 Cal.App.
191 [232 P. 985] ; People v. Emmons, 7 Cal.App. 685, 690691 [95 P. 1032].) [27] Nor do we think that the impeachment justifying production is necessarily restricted to impeachment by prior inconsistent statements to the exclusion, for
example, of impeachment for bias. (See .Asg~"ll v. United
States, supra, 60 F.2d at 779.)
[28a] In the present case the court denied production on
the ground that the statements could not be used to impeach
the witnesses. We are at a loss to understand how the court
could have reached this conclusion without even seeing the
statements. Whether they were in writing or signed by the
witnesses the record does not show, and it is safe to say that
no one but the prosecution knew. Even if they were not signed,
defendant might have been able to show, by the testimony of
a stenographer or other witnesses or by the admissions of
Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel themselves, that the statements
had been accurately transcribed and therefore could be used
for impeachment. (See Peopk v. Bjornsen, 79 Cal.App.2d
519, 534-535 [180 P.2d 443]; People v. Orosco, 73 Cal.
App. 580, 593 [239 P. 82].)
[29] Obviously a defendant cannot show conclusively that
a document is admissible without seeing it, and yet in order
to see it he is told that he must show that it is admissible.
The proper test for determining whether production must
be granted is not whether the evidence has been conclusively
proved admissible but whether, as stated in People v. Glaze,
lUpt"a, at 158, "there is good reason to believe that the document when produced would be admissible in evidence for some
purpose in the case. . . ." There must be more than a mere
possibility that the statements when produced will contain
contradictory matter and be in such a form that they can be
used to impeach, but the chance that it may turn out eventually that they cannot be used for this purpose should not
block production at the threshold.
This precise problem, the relation between admissibility
and the right to production, was presented in Gordon v.
United Slates, $upra, and the court there concluded that the
prosecution had not conceded enough in admitting that it
would be error to refuse to order production if it would be
error not to admit the evidence once produced. "[P]roduction may sometimes be required though inspection may show
that the document could properly be excluded." ,(344 U.S.
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at 418.) As in the ease before us, the oeurt was facea with
a record that showed no reason why the statements once produced could not be used for impeachment.
[28b] That the statements of Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel
existed and were in the possession of the prosecution or the
pollee was never denied; that it was probable that they were
inconsistent with the witnesses' testimony was shown by the
newspaper accounts. Defendant was unable to prove conclusively that the statements were in a form warranting use
for impeachment only because the prosecution kept them in
its exclusive control. The prosecution did not claim that the
necessities of law enforcement required that the statements
be kept confidential, and in view of the fact that the police
had released the substance of the statements to the press, there
could be no such claim. Defendant was not exploring for
generally useful information, but demanded particular documents reasonably thought to be usable for the specific purpose of impeachment. Finally, defendant went as far as he
could without benefit of the statements, at least in the ease
of Mrs. Burgess. Once the witness denied the prior inconsistencies, there was nothing further defendant could do to
press the impeachment. It does not appear that ther.e were
any witnesses to the statements who could recall exactly what
had been said, and even if there were defendant was not compeD.ed to rely on them if far more impressive documentary
proof was at hand. We conclude that defendant sustained
the burden imposed on him and that it was error to vacate
the subpoena.
.
[.3Oa] In deciding whether this error was prejudicial we
must determine whether there was a reasonable probability
that the jury would have reached a dDferent verdict had· defendant been allowed to obtain and introduce in evidence
prior inconsistent statements of the eyewitnesses. (People
v. Watson, 46 CaLM 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Even if we
assume that prior inconsistent statements would have impaired the value of the eyewitness testimony, there remained
against defend~t the fingerprint evidence, the evidence that
he possessed hand-cast bullets that probably had a common
origin with bullets found at the scene of the crime and a
holster that had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38 Special,
and the evidence that he had had a gun in addition to those
he admitted owning.
Weighed against this evidence was the testimony of the
Risers that they had not been at the Hilltop on July 11th.
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Both stated that they had been at the house of Della Fay
Jones, Roscoe's girl friend, until 7 :30 or 8 o'clock in the
evening, and then had gone on, Roscoe and Della to a movie
and Richard on a round of Stockton bars. Richard returned
home about midnight and did not see Roscoe until the next
morning. Della Fay Jones did not testify.
Richard had earlier told police that it was probably on the
11th that he and Roscoe had gone to Riverbank to buy furniture, returning to Stockton by way of Oakdale where they
stopped at a bar. At the trial he explained that he had
been confused about the dates as a result of almost continuous
questioning by the police for three or four days. Roscoe
could not recall the Riverbank expedition at all.
Witness Basford testified that the two men he met coming
into the Hilltop Cafe had been in a Chrysler, Buick or
Pontiac. Both brothers testified that Roscoe's Chrysler had
a flat tire on the 11th, and Roscoe said that it had been left
in the backyard of their mother's house from the 10th until
the 13th, while they used an old Dodge converted into a
truck. Their mother stated that the Chrysler had been in
the yard from the 10th to the 13th, and that if it had been
removed it could only have been while she was asleep. A
witness for the prosecution testified that he had seen the
brothers getting into the Chrysler on the afternoon or evening
of the 11th, but on cross-examination his testimony proved
extremely weak. .
[31] Fingerprin't evidence is the atrongest evidence of
identity, and is ordinarily 811fticient alone to identify the defendant. (See People v. Adamson, 2'7 Ca1.2d 478, 495 [165
P.2d 8], affd. 832 U.S. 4:6 [67 S.Ot. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171
A.L.R.1223].) [BOb] Here there is in addition to the fingerprint evidence the evidence of a common origin for the handcast bullets, a "remarkable resemblance" which we have no
reason to believe could be the result of chance. The evidence
that the holster had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38
Special, and that defendant had possessed an unidentified
third gun, although not as strong as the fingerprint and bullet
evidence, contribute to an impressive total of proof identifying defendant. We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is not
reasonably probable that the jury, faced with this evidence,
would have chosen to believe instead the unsupported testimoD1' of defendant that he had not been at the Hilltop Cafe
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on the night of July 11th; accordingly, there has been no mis
carriage of justice. (Oal. Qonst., art. VI, § 4¥.a.)
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, O. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McOomb, J.
con~urred.

OARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by a majori
of this court that while it was error it was not prejudicia
error for the trial court to deny defendant the right to produc
documents containing statements by eyewitnesses allegedl
contrary to those made at the trial by such witnesses. I
my opinion nothing could be more prejudicial. It is impossible for an appellate court to say that the jury was not
impressed by testimony which absolutely identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime given by persons
present at the time the crime was committed.
In view of the holding in Gordo'n v. Uniteil States, 344 U.S.
414 [73 S.Ot. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447], it seems incredible that a
majority of this court could hold that this error was not
prejudicial. The same problem was there presented. The
cOUrt had this to say: "By proper cross-examination, defense
counsel laid a foundation for his demand by showing that
the documents were in existence, were in possession of the
Government, were made by the Government's witness under
examiDstion, were contradictory of his present testimony, and
that the contradiction was as to relevant, important and
material matters which directly bore on the main issue being
tried: the participation of the accused in the crime. The
demand was for production of these specific documents and
did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among
documents possessed by the Government on the chance that
something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a demand for statements taken from persons or informants not
offered as witnesses. The Government did not assert any
privilege for the documents on grounds of national security,
confidential character, public interest, or otherwise. • • •
Indeed, we would find it hard to withstand the force of Judge
Oooley's observation in a similar situation that 'The State
has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure
of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused
parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons.' [PeopZe
v. DtwiI, 52 Mich. 569 (18 N.W. 362, 363).] In the light
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of our reason and experience, the better rule is that upon
the foundation that was laid the court should have overruled
the objections which the Government advanced and ordered
production of the documents.
"The trial court, of course, had no occasion to rule as to
their admissibility, and we find it appropriate to consider that
question only because the Government argues that the trial
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, might have excluded
these prior contradictory statements and, since that would
not have amounted to reversible error, it was not such to
decline their production. We think this misconceives the issue.
It is unnecessary to decide whether it would have been reversible error for the trial judge to exclude these statements
once they had been produced and inspected. For production
purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant,
competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule; for rarely
can the trial judge understandingly exercise his discretion
to exclude a document which he has not seen, and tlO appeUate
cou.rl could ratiOftally say 10hether the ezclucling of emaence
unknown to the record 10GB error, or, if '0, WGB harmless. The
question to be answered on an application for an order to
produce is one of admissibility under traditional canons of
evidence, and not whether exclusion might be overlooked as
harmless error.
"The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that Marshall's admission, on cross-examination, of the implicit contradiction between the documents and his testimony removed the
need for resort to the statements and the admission was
the accused were entitled to demand. We cannot agree. We
think that an admission that a contradiction is contained in
a writing should not bar admission of the document itself in
evidence, providing it meets all other requirements of admissibility and no valid claim of privilege is raised against
it. The elementary wisdom of the best evidence rule rests
on the fact that the document is a more reliable, complete
and accurate source of information as to its contents and
meaning than anyone's description and this is no less true
as to the extent and circumstances of a contradiction. We
hold that the accused is entitled to the appliCation of that
rule, not merely because it will emphasize the contradiction
to the jury, but because it will best inform them as to the
document's impeaching weigl,tt and significance. Traditional
rules of admissibility prevent opening the door to documents
which merely differ on immaterial matters. The oZleged
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contradictions to this witness' testimony relate not to collateral matters but to the tlery incrimination of petitioners."
(Emphasis added; pp. 418-421.) It was concluded: "The
Government, in its brief, argues strongly for the widest sort
of discretion in the trial judge in these matters and urges
that even if we find error or irregularity we disregard it as
harmless and affirm the conviction. We are well aware of the
necessity that appellate courts give the trial judge wide latitude in control of cross-examination, especially in dealing with
collateral evidence as to character. Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469 [69 S.Ot. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168]. But this principle
cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from
the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony. Reversals should not be
based on trivial, theoretical and harmless rulings. But we
cannot say that these errors were unlikely to have influenced
the jury's verdict. We believe they prejudiced substantial
rights and the judgment must be Reversed." (Pp. 422-423.)
The eyewitness testimony was by far the most important
evidence against this defendant. The murder weapon was
never found; the similarity in the hand~cast bullets was only
that they were "probably of common origin"; and it was
thought that defendant's holster had once carried a gun of
a type of the murder weapon. It would appear to me that,
in Judge Oooley's language, the state should have no interest
in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of facts; that all
material and relevant facts should be set forth for the determination of the jury and, if certain state witnesses have been
accused of making contradictory statements relating to a
material fact, those statements should also be before the jury
so that it could determine for itself the trustworthiness of such
witnesses. The American concept of due process most certainly encompasses the right of an accused to be confronted
by trustworthy witnesses and the right to show, if he can,
that witnesses against him may not be worthy of belief. Due
process most certainly also encompasses the concept that the
state will not seek to conceal material evidence in the accused's
favor. If due process of law does not encompass such concepts, then we have most assuredly departed a long way from
the very foundation upon which our system of justice reststhe ideal th~t every man is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 [48 S.Ct.
564, '12 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376]), it is better that one
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criminal escape than that the government play an ignoble part.
In Mesarosk v. United States (25 L.W. 4001, 4004, 4005)
the government moved to remand the case to the trial eourt
because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals
by Mazzei, a government witness, although contending that
the testimony given in the instant case by Mazzei was "entirely
truthful and credible." The government sought to have the
matter remanded to the District Court for a full consideration
of the credibility of the testimony of the witness Mazzei. The
counter-motion of petitioners asked for a new trial. In reversing the judgments below with directions to grant the petitioners a new trial, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
the court, had this to say: "Mazzei, by his testimony, has
poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot
be cleansed without :first draining it of all impurity. This is
a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings of the federal courts. If it has
any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see that the waters
of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here,
the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity.
'The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of
the most cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance
is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with
supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal
courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [63 S.Ct.
608, 87 L.Ed. 819]. Therefore, fastidious regard for the
honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to
make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest
that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be
asserted.' Oommunist Party v. Subversive Activities Oontrol
Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124 [76 s.Ot. 663, 100 L.Ed. 1003].
"The government of a strong and free nation does not need
convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot afford to
abide with them. The interests of justice call for a reversal
of the judgments below with direction to grant the petitioners
a new trial. "
Surely the great State of California does not need convictions based upon the deprivation of an accused's constitutional
right to due process of law.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
30, 1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

